Current Circuit Splits
The following pages contain brief summaries, drafted by the
members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, of circuit splits identified by
a federal court of appeals opinion between February 1, 2006 and August
31, 2006. This collection is organized by civil and criminal matters, then
by subject matter.
Each summary briefly describes a current circuit split. It is intended
to give only the briefest synopsis of the circuit split, not a comprehensive
analysis. This compilation makes no claim to be exhaustive, but will
hopefully serve the reader well as a reference starting point.
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CIVIL MATTERS
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Medicaid Act – Conferral of Unambiguous Rights: Westside
Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532 (6th Cir. 2006)
The 6th Circuit addressed the issue of ‘“[w]hether . . . there is a
private right of action under § 1983’ for alleged noncompliance with the
Medicaid Act.” Id. at 536 (citation omitted). The court adhered to the
Supreme Court decision in Gonzaga University v. Doe, which utilized
the Blessing test to “guide judicial inquiry into whether or not a statute
confers a right” that could provide a cause of action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 541-42. In Gonzaga, the Court made clear that
rights must be unambiguously conferred, and thus the relevant inquiry
was “whether or not Congress intended to confer individual rights upon a
class of beneficiaries.” Id. After Gonzaga, the 8th Circuit held that there
was a right conferred under § 1396a(a)(30) while the 1st and 9th Circuits
held that there was no such right. Id. In this case, the 6th Circuit followed
the 1st and 9th Circuits to hold that the language of § 1396a(a)(30) does
not use such “rights-creating” language to evince congressional intent to
create an individually enforceable right in the Medicaid Act. Id. at 542.
The court reasoned that the aggregate focus of § 1396a(a)(30) did not
evince congressional intent to confer an individually enforceable right.
See id. Additionally, the court found that the broad language suggested
that the section is “concerned with overall methodology rather than
conferring individually enforceable rights on individual Medicaid
recipients.” Id. at 543. Thus, the court held that “[a]fter examining the
text and structure of § 1396a(a)(30), we agree with the First and Ninth
Circuits that § 1396a(a)(30) fails the first prong of the Blessing test and
does not therefore provide Medicaid recipients or providers with a right
enforceable under § 1983.” Id. at 542.
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False Claims Act – Federal and State Statutory Requirements
of “Public Disclosure”: United States v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,
457 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006)
Noting a split among the circuits regarding the action of notification
to the government before “public disclosure,” the 9th Circuit held that
the California False Claims Act did not require individuals to inform the
government before making the “public disclosure” at issue to qualify as
“original sources.” Id. at 1022. The court followed precedents from the
2nd and 9th Circuits interpreting the federal False Claims Act, since the
California statute was similar in “relevant wording and purposes.” Id. at
1021.
Prison Litigation Reform Act – Limits on Monetary Damages:
Boxer X v. Donald, 169 F. App’x 555 (11th Cir. 2006)
The 11th Circuit acknowledged that prisoners suing for mental,
emotional, and physical injuries suffered while in custody may not
receive compensatory damages under the Prison Litigation Reform Act.
Id. at 558. The court indicated that precedent in the 11th Circuit did not
resolve the question of punitive damages, explaining that the 7th and
D.C. Circuits were split on the propriety of punitive damages under the
Act when compensatory damages were not available. Id. The 11th
Circuit also noted that the 7th, 9th, and 10th Circuits have interpreted §
1997e(e) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act to allow a prisoner to seek
nominal damages, but the court declined to decide on that issue in this
case, since it determined that the prisoner’s constitutional claims were
meritless. Id. at 559.

Prison Litigation Reform Act – Failure to Exhaust
Administrative Remedies: Roles v. Maddox, 439 F.3d 1016 (9th
Cir. 2006)
The 9th Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a
prisoner’s complaint asserting violations of his First Amendment rights
and Idaho law regarding the confiscation of magazines from his prison
cell. Id. at 1016. The 9th Circuit cited cases from the 6th, 10th, and 11th
Circuits supporting its determination that the plain language of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act to exhaust all administrative remedies applied to
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prisoners held in private prisons. Id. at 1018. The 9th Circuit also
recognized the United States Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of
“prison conditions” within the Act, and noted the wide range of prisoner
claims subjected to the exhaustion requirement by the 2nd, 6th, 8th, and
9th Circuits. Id.

Airline Liability – Lack of Liability Under the Warsaw
Convention for Failure to Warn of the Possibility of Medical
Maladies: Caman v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., No. 03-56810, 2006 U.S.
App. LEXIS 19519 (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2006)
The 9th Circuit addressed whether a passenger developed a medical
malady known as Deep Vein Thrombosis (“DVT”) as a result of an
international flight. Id. at *2. The passenger brought an action under
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, which imputes liability to the
carrier “for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a
passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the
accident which caused the damage . . . took place on board the aircraft or
in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.” Id.
at *11. The court reasoned that in order for his malady to qualify as an
“accident,” the passenger must show that it was caused by an
“unexpected or unusual event.” Id. at *13. The plaintiff was not able to
show this requirement. Id. Furthermore, the court distinguished this case
from others, stating that the occurrence of the malady was not an “event”
constituting Article 17 liability because the airline’s failure to warn of
the risk of DVT was more akin to an omission rather than a liabilityinducing commission. Id. The court held that the airline’s failure to warn
the passenger of the possibility of developing the medical malady during
the flight did “not constitute an ‘accident’ or an event under the Warsaw
Convention.” Id. at *2.
Retaliatory Discharge – Statutory Construction: Harding v.
Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 448 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
The Federal Circuit held that provisions in 38 U.S.C. § 7425 do not
bar a plaintiff’s retaliatory discharge claim under 5 U.S.C. § 2105. Id. at
1376. The court determined that Title 5 both broadly, and expressly,
stated Congress’s intent to trump any contrary provisions of Title 38
regarding legal action for retaliatory discharge for whistleblowing. Id. at
1375-76. The court noted that other circuits have determined that Title 5
only trumps Title 38 when the particular conflicting Title 5 provision
expressly states that it supersedes the contrary Title 38 provision. Id. at
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1376. However, the Federal Circuit distinguished these cases from the
present matter because those cases dealt with the “simpler circumstance”
where the Title 5 provision at issue made no express or implied reference
to Congressional intent to supersede Title 38. Id.

Washington Law Against Discrimination – Federal Preemption
of State Anti-Discrimination Statutes: Kroske v. US Bank Corp.,
No. 04-35187, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 3367 (9th Cir. Feb. 13,
2006)
The 9th Circuit held that “state anti-discrimination statutes enacted
under a state’s police powers are [not] preempted by the banking laws
simply because they are part of a general category of ‘state-created
employment right[s].’” Id. at *23-24. The 9th Circuit noted that “federal
preemption of the [state anti-discrimination law] must be considered in
light of Congress’s enactment of relevant federal employment
discrimination laws and the cooperative state-federal anti-discrimination
scheme.” Id. at *24. The court found that the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act’s anti-discrimination provisions conflicted with, and
thus limited, 29 USCS § 24(Fifth) which grants national banking
associations the power to dismiss officers at will. Id. at *27.
Accordingly, the 9th Circuit concluded that the plaintiff’s state law antidiscrimination claims under the Washington Law Against
Discrimination, were not preempted by federal banking laws. Id. at *30.
This was a direct split with the 6th Circuit’s holding that a Michigan
anti-discrimination statute was preempted by the Federal Reserve Act’s
“at-pleasure provision.” Id. at *23.

Securities Exchange Act – Enforcement: SEC v. J.W. Barclay &
Co., 442 F.3d 834 (3d Cir. 2006)
The SEC instituted an action against Mr. Bruno, the president of the
defendant corporation, seeking repayment of a derogatory debt the
corporation owed the SEC for violation of a securities law. Id. at 837.
The SEC acted pursuant to § 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, which imposes joint and several liability upon a “control person”
for all liabilities that the controlled person (here, a corporation) has “to
any person.” Id. at 838. Specifically, the SEC argued that Mr. Bruno, a
“control person” of the corporation, was liable to the SEC for the debts
the corporation had “to any person.” Id. The court recognized a split
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between the 2nd and 6th Circuits on the issue of whether the SEC is a
“person” for purposes of § 20(a), and hence whether it could act pursuant
to the same. Id. at 842. The court then adopted the 2nd Circuit’s position
that the SEC is a person under § 20(a), and rejected the 6th Circuit’s
position to the contrary. Id. The court explained that the ruling on this
matter was largely dictated by the 1975 amendment to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, which expanded the definition of “‘person’ so as
to include governments and government agencies.” Id.

Employment – 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) – Retaliation Claims May
be Predicated Upon a Hostile Work Environment: Jensen v.
Potter, 435 F.3d 444 (3d Cir. 2006)
The 3rd Circuit followed the majority approach and held that a
retaliation claim “predicated upon a hostile work environment is
cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).” Id. at 448. The court
explained that this statute protects employees who are involved in any
manner in Title VII actions or investigations from discrimination. Id. The
3rd Circuit noted that both the 5th and 8th Circuits limit the statute “to
‘ultimate employment decisions,’ and thus do not view harassment to be
within the statute’s reach.” Id. The 3rd Circuit explained that § 2000e3(a) prohibited “a quantum of discrimination coterminous with that
prohibited by § 2000e-2(a).” Id. The court noted several cases involving
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) prohibiting discrimination in the workplace
based on sex, race, religion, and national origin. Id. at 449. The court
held that “discriminatory ridicule or abuse can so infect a workplace that
it alters the terms or conditions of the plaintiff’s employment” and is
offensive to § 2000e-2(a) and therefore to § 2000e-3(a) as well. Id.

Employment – Title VII Discrimination: Momah v. Dominguez,
175 F. App’x 11 (6th Cir. 2006)
The court addressed the issue of whether a “materially adverse
action” actionable under Title VII would include a “purely lateral
transfer or denial of the same.” Id. at 21. The court noted that, by
definition, such a transfer results in no decrease in title, pay or benefits,
and is thus not an adverse employment action. The court’s “conclusion
[remained] consistent with the authority of [its] sister circuits.” Id.
Furthermore, the court employed “an objective test that considers
whether the employment action at issue was objectively intolerable to a
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reasonable person.” Id. at 28. The court stated, “Our circuit’s focus on
objective indicia of adversity is consistent with the holdings of our sister
circuits that an employee’s subjective preference for one position over
another is insufficient to render the denial of a purely lateral transfer an
adverse employment action under Title VII.” Id. at 29.

Jurisdiction for Judicial Review – Appellate Jurisdiction
Regarding Relief Granted Under 8 U.S.C. 1229: Cevilla v.
Gonzales, 446 F.3d 658 (7th Cir. 2006)
The court explained that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) declares
“notwithstanding any other provision of law . . . no court shall have
jurisdiction to review (i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief
under section . . . 1229b . . .” except for “constitutional claims or
questions of law.” Id. at 660. The court observed that the 5th, 6th and 9th
Circuits have interpreted this subsection of 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to mean
“that despite its uncompromising language it does not bar judicial review
of rulings that are not discretionary in character.” Id. at 661. The court
joined the 2nd Circuit in disagreeing with this interpretation, holding that
“the statute itself, read literally, goes further and places all rulings other
than those resolving questions of law or constitutional issues beyond the
power of judicial review.” Id. Although the court found that both the
Immigration Judge and the BIA had clearly erred on the factual question
of plaintiff’s credibility, the court declared that the error did not involve
a question of law or a constitutional issue. Therefore, the 7th Circuit
determined that it had no jurisdiction to reverse on such an error and
consequently could not grant an appeal. Id. at 663.

Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act –
Fragmentary De Novo Review on Appeal: Laber v. Harvey, 438
F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 2006)
In an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s Office of
Federal Operations case, the 4th Circuit joined the 7th, 10th, and 11th
Circuits in denying fragmentary de novo review to a federal employeeplaintiff who did not want to enforce a favorable ruling when he
prevailed on liability but was unhappy with the remedial reward. Id. at
424. The court concluded that Title VII does not authorize a federal
employee to bring a de novo civil action for the portion of the ruling he
considers an insufficient remedy; the employee must again place the
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employing agency’s discrimination at issue. Id. at 423. In contrast, the
9th Circuit allows fragmentary de novo review in the enforcement
context. Id.

ERISA – Equitable Relief: Popowski v. Parrott, 461 F.3d 1367
(11th Cir. 2006)
In this consolidated case, the appellant-fiduciaries sought
reimbursement for medical expenses incurred pursuant to employee
health-care plans. Id. at 1369. The beneficiaries each had their medical
expenses paid according to their plans, and then subsequently collected
damages from their respective tortfeasors. Id. at 1370-71. In addition to
filing breach-of-contract claims, appellants brought claims under 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA). Id. The court noted that “[a] plan fiduciary may bring a
civil action under ERISA . . . to obtain other ‘appropriate equitable
relief.’” Id. at 1372. With respect to one of the claims, the district court
was “faced with a split among the circuits regarding the scope of
equitable relief under ERISA.” Id. at 1370. Relying on the persuasive
authority from the 6th and 9th Circuits, the district court concluded that
appellants “sought legal rather than equitable restitution” and dismissed
the claim. Id. at 1371. The 11th Circuit rejected this interpretation and
instead followed the guidance from the Supreme Court’s decision in
Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, 126 S. Ct. 1869 (2006). Id. at
1373. In Sereboff, the Supreme Court held that “as long as a plaintiff is
able to establish that ‘the basis for its claim is equitable,’ bringing the
claim as an action for breach of contract will not disqualify it under §
1132(a)(3).” Id. at 1372. The 11th Circuit reasoned that although a claim
may arise out of a breach of contract, equitable relief is still plausible
when seeking “recovery through a constructive trust or equitable lien on
a specifically identified fund.” Id. at 1373. One of the appellantfiduciaries prevailed on equitable claims because the beneficiary had
placed the settlement funds directly into a personal bank account and the
funds were in the beneficiary’s possession. Id. In this respect, seeking
reimbursement of these funds did rise to equitable relief. Id. at 1373-74.
ERISA – Fiduciaries: Briscoe v. Fine, 444 F.3d 478 (6th Cir.
2006)
Plaintiffs sought review of a district court’s ruling that their former
employer and a third party administrator of the employer’s healthcare
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plan were not ERISA fiduciaries. Id. at 485. The court first clarified that
the relevant inquiry is not whether a person is a fiduciary with respect to
certain beneficiaries, but rather, “whether a person is a fiduciary with
respect to [a] particular activity in question.” Id. at 486. The court
considered the import of a bulletin issued by the Department of Labor
(“DOL”), which asserted that members of the board of directors are
ERISA fiduciaries insofar as they exercise certain discretionary authority
or control. Id. at 486-87. The court then recognized that the circuits have
split on their interpretation of the DOL bulletin in circumstances where
“a corporation is the named fiduciary, but has not explicitly delegated
administrative authority to its corporate directors.” Id. at 487.
The court noted the 3rd Circuit’s holding that, in this situation, the
directors are not fiduciaries, absent a showing that they had “individual
discretionary roles.” Id. The court then contrasted this holding with that
of the 5th and 9th Circuits, which rejected the 3rd Circuit’s ruling to the
extent that it held that corporate officers were not fiduciaries if the
corporation was the named fiduciary. Id. Synthesizing these cases, the
court noted that, despite the purported disagreement, these circuits are in
agreement that “the officers of a corporation named as a fiduciary of its
healthcare plan are themselves fiduciaries where they exercise
discretionary authority over plan assets or plan management,” but they
differ on whether there is a presumption one way or the other that the
officers have acted in such capacity. Id. In the final analysis, the court
found that the result of the present case was the same under either
approach, and thus the court was not compelled to rule on where the
presumption lay. Id. at 487-88.

Class Certification – The Predominance Requirement: Augustin
v. Jablonsky, 461 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006)
The 2nd Circuit held that district courts “may employ Rule
23(c)(4)(a) to certify a class on a designated issue regardless of whether
the claim as a whole satisfies the predominance test.” Id.at 230. The
court explained that the 5th Circuit adopted a strict application of the
predominance requirement, while the 9th Circuit, relying on its own
precedent, allowed district courts to isolate common issues and allow
class treatment of those common issues. Id. at 226. The 2nd Circuit
explained that the plain language, structure, and the notes of the
Advisory Committee pertaining to Rule 23 supported the 9th Circuit’s
view. Id. For those reasons, the court held that a district court “may
employ subsection (c)(4) to certify a class . . . regardless of whether the
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claim as a whole satisfies Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement.”
Id. at 227.

Tax – Timely Mailing: Crook v. Comm’r, 173 F. App’x 653 (10th
Cir. 2006)
The circuits disagree as to “the evidence required or permitted to
prove timely mailing under [the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.] §
7502.” Id. at 657. In the 2nd and 6th Circuits, actual delivery with a
legible postmark, “or a receipt for registered or certified mail, constitute
the only satisfactory forms of proof, and no extrinsic evidence of mailing
can be considered.” Id. Other circuits, such as the 8th and 9th, do allow
extrinsic evidence that demonstrates that a document has been mailed. Id.
This court disposed of the case without aligning itself with either
interpretation, instead holding that “a taxpayer must comply with the
statutory requirements of § 7502 in order to benefit from the mailing-asdelivery rule . . . ‘self serving declarations of mailing without more are
insufficient to invoke the presumption of delivery.’” Id. at 657 (citation
omitted).

Equal Protection – Congressional Override of Supreme Court
Precedent: Bolden v. City of Topeka, 441 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir.
2006)
The court considered whether recent amendments by Congress to
42 U.S.C. § 1981 overruled the Supreme Court decision in Jett v. Dallas
Independent School District, 491 U.S. 701 (1981), which had allowed
claims against state actors for violations of § 1981, but only to receive
the remedies provided under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 1134. The court
noted that the 9th Circuit ruled that the amendment to § 1981 did allow
for implied causes of actions and thus overruled the decision in Jett. Id.
at 1136. The 5th and 11th Circuits have ruled differently, stating that the
amendment to § 1981 did not provide any new cause of action and that
the amendment did not overrule Jett in any way. Id. at 1136-37. The 10th
Circuit agreed with the finding in Butts, and ruled that claims against
state actors arising from § 1981 violations can only be raised under §
1983. Id. at 1137.
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Subject Matter Jurisdiction – Judicial Review of Extreme
Cruelty: Wilmore v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2006)
The 5th Circuit followed the 10th Circuit, and disagreed with the
9th Circuit, holding that the discretionary determination of “extreme
cruelty” bars the court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at
527. The court noted that “although the extreme cruelty definition
provides some guidance in making this determination, it certainly does
not remove the discretion afforded by Congress.” Id. at 528. The court
also looked at the statutory language, determining that the jurisdictionstripping provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (Supp. V 2005), lists extreme
cruelty as discretionary. Id. This holding bars the court from having
subject matter jurisdiction over “extreme cruelty” appeals pursuant to 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (Supp. V 2005). Id.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
Deliberative Process Privilege – Invocation by Lesser Officials:
Marriott Int’l Resorts, L.P. v. United States, 437 F.3d 1302 (Fed.
Cir. 2006)
The Federal Circuit followed the majority rule among the circuits in
holding that lesser officers of government agencies may invoke the
deliberative process privilege. Id. at 1306. The court noted that the
Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals, the D.C. and 5th Circuits have
held that lesser officers may invoke privileges, while the 3rd Circuit
refused to allow an attorney to invoke the executive privilege. Id. at
1306-07. The “agency head” requirement, which required a “formal
claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has
control over the matter, after actual person consideration by that officer,”
applied only to the “military and state secrets privilege.” Id. at 1306.
Agreeing with the D.C. Circuit’s findings that “delegation promotes both
efficiency in judicial administration and actual personal involvement in
the complex process of invoking the privilege,” and noting that unlike
the state’s secrets privilege, the deliberative process privilege was not
absolute, the Federal Circuit held that “the head of an Agency can, when
carefully undertaken, delegate authority to invoke the deliberative
process privilege on the Agency’s behalf.” Id. at 1307-08.
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Contracts – Forum Selection Clause: Servewell Plumbing, L.L.C.
v. Fed. Ins. Co., 439 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 2006)
The court addressed the issue of “whether to apply state or federal
law in determining the enforceability” of a forum selection clause. Id. at
789. The court recognized that “[b]ecause ‘the enforceability of a forum
selection clause concerns both the substantive law of contracts and the
procedural law of venue,’ there is some disagreement among the circuits
over whether state or federal law applies.” Id. (citation omitted). The
court noted that it had not yet adopted a definitive position on this issue,
and furthermore, the court declined to do so in this case because “both
Arkansas and Florida follow the federal standard announced by the
Supreme Court in M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1
(1972), . . . and neither party argues that the application of one or another
body of law would materially affect the outcome.” Id.

Securities Litigation – Pleading Requirements: Deephaven
Private Placement Trading, Ltd. v. Grant Thornton & Co., 454 F.3d
1168 (10th Cir. 2006)
The 10th Circuit disagreed with the 1st Circuit’s application of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4,
which lays out the pleading standards of claims arising out of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.S. § 78r(a). Id. at 117374. Section 78u-4(b)(1) of the PSLRA requires that a complaint specify
“each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons
why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the
statement or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint
shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.” Id.
at 1173. In a similar case, the 1st Circuit held that “the allegations
supporting investor-plaintiff’s Section 18(a) claim against the auditor
satisfied the PSLRA’s pleading requirements.” Id. at 1174 n.5. The 10th
Circuit found that the 1st Circuit merely assumed that violations of
GAAP standards meant they [the auditors] misled within the meaning of
Section 18(a). Id. In conclusion, the 10th Circuit found “a more nuanced
analysis [to be] appropriate.” Id.
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Discovery Appeals – Discovery Orders and the Requirements of
the Cohen Doctrine: Goodman v. Harris County, 443 F.3d 464
(5th Cir. 2006)
The 5th Circuit determined whether a court order for a litigant to
submit to an examination was an immediately appealable decision under
the collateral order doctrine as the court had allowed in Acosta v.
Tenneco Oil Co., 913 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1990). Id. at 467. In Acosta, the
court had allowed an appeal of a Rule 35 order, stating it qualified as a
collateral order under the Cohen doctrine and was subject to immediate
review. Id. at 468 n.3. The 5th Circuit noted that the 7th Circuit
disagreed with the holding in Acosta, finding that the reasoning would
“make every discovery order appealable.” Id. at 468 n.4. The 5th Circuit
did not question the validity of its earlier decision in Acosta, stating that
certain orders under Rule 35 were immediately appealable. However,
the court found that the order made by the district court in this case was
not one that qualified as a collateral order under the Cohen doctrine and
dismissed the appeal. Id. at 469.

Class Action Certification – Presumption of Unawareness:
Thorn v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 445 F.3d 311 (4th Cir. 2006)
The 4th Circuit ruled that plaintiffs are not “entitled to a class-wide
presumption of unawareness because the defendants concealed . . . dualrate policies.” Id. at 325 n.15. The court noted that “[a] presumption
arises when proof of one fact gives rise to a ‘natural inference’ that
another fact is true and proof of the second fact is difficult to obtain.” Id.
at 324. The 4th Circuit found that “the class members’ unawareness of
their cause of action is the ‘natural inference’ of the defendant’s
concealment, and, at any rate, evidence of unawareness of the cause of
action is information uniquely in the class’s possession, a fact that
defeats the necessity of a presumption in the class’s favor.” Id. The court
noted that this ruling is in dispute with the determination of the 5th
Circuit. Id. at 325 n.15.
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IMMIGRATION
Unilateralism – Judicial Review of BIA Decisions: Kambolli v.
Gonzales, 449 F.3d 454 (2d Cir. 2006)
The 2nd Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review a claim
that a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) member erred by
unilaterally affirming the decision of an immigration judge without
referring the case to a three-member panel for review. Id. at 465. This
holding comported with similar cases in the 8th and 10th Circuits, which
have denied review of a unilateral affirmation by one BIA member
because, pursuant to the BIA’s “streamlining” procedure outlined in 8
C.F.R. § 1003.1(e), the BIA member is not permitted to explain his
reasoning for affirming. Id. at 459-60. According to the 10th Circuit,
appellate review is improper where there is no explanation for the BIA’s
affirmation of the immigration judge’s decision. Id. at 460. Other
circuits, such as the 1st, 3rd and 9th, have taken the contrary view and
remanded one-member BIA decisions for reconsideration by a 3-member
panel. Id.
Jurisdiction – Voluntary Departures: Thapa v. Gonzales, 460
F.3d 323 (2d Cir. 2006)
The court decided the issue of whether it had jurisdiction over
voluntary departures “issued by an immigration judge or the Board of
Immigration Appeals.” Id. at 324. The court noted that the “First, Third,
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have all concluded that the
Courts of Appeals do have such authority. . . . Only the Fourth Circuit
has reached the opposite result.” Id. at 329. The court sided with the
majority of circuits, and found that there is “nothing in any statutory or
regulatory provision relating to voluntary departure that rebuts the
presumption that courts may stay an agency order pending review of a
petition on the merits.” Id. at 332. The court held that “the court of
appeals in its discretion may restrain or suspend, in whole or in part, the
operation of the order pending the final hearing and determination of the
petition.” Id. at 329.
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Removal – Applicability of Retroactive Statutes: Hem v. Maurer,
458 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2006)
Prior to 1996, an alien convicted of an aggravated felony, who had
INS proceedings for removal brought against him, could seek relief
under § 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Id. at 1186. The
court noted that this section granted the Attorney General discretion to
stay the deportation proceedings. Id. The court noted that the section was
repealed by § 304(b) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”). Id. The Attorney General
applied § 304(b) retroactively, instituting removal proceedings against
those aliens with aggravated assault convictions pre-dating the passage
of IIRIRA. Id. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court held “that
application of IIRIRA § 304(b) would be impermissibly retroactive to
aliens whose aggravated felony convictions followed from guilty pleas.”
Id.. The question remains as to whether § 304(b) would be impermissibly
retroactive to those convicted by a jury trial. Id. at 1187. The court
concluded that “courts have diverged on whether, and to what extent,
litigants must show they relied on pre-IIRIRA law to sustain an IIRIRA
retroactivity claim.” Id. The court joined the 3rd, 4th, and 6th Circuits,
which “require [merely] that a reasonable litigant could have ‘objectively
relied’ on the availability of § 212(c) in a given situation . . . [While the
1st, 2nd, and 11th Circuits] demand that litigants demonstrate they
actually relied on the availability of such relief.” Id. The court concluded
that a “defendant who proceeds to trial but forgoes his right to appeal
when § 212(c) relief was potentially available, has suffered retroactive
effects under IIRIRA.” Id.

Removal – Statutory Scheme: Banda-Ortiz v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d
387 (5th Cir. 2006)
This appeal considered whether a timely filed motion to re-open a
removal case tolled an alien’s voluntary departure period. Id. at 388-89.
The statutory scheme provided that an alien who fails to depart
voluntarily as scheduled is ineligible for cancellation of removal for 10
years. Id. at 389. However, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) states that “any
departure from the United States, including the deportation or removal of
a person who is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or removal
proceedings, occurring after the filing of a motion to reopen or a motion
to reconsider, shall constitute a withdrawal of such motion.” Id.
The plaintiff argued the 3rd, 8th, and 9th Circuits’ position that this
would create an absurd result by allowing a plaintiff who is removing
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voluntarily to make a motion to reopen, then force him to leave, thereby
voiding that motion. Id. This court disagreed with that assertion, and
declined “to read into 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d) the requirement that the
[Board of Immigration Appeals] automatically toll an alien’s voluntary
departure period during the pendency of a motion to reopen.” Id. at 391.
On the contrary, the 5th Circuit found that the purpose of the statutory
scheme was an exchange of benefits, permitting an alien the remedy of
filing and resolving a motion to reopen, so long as it does not interfere
with the agreed upon voluntary departure date, while preserving the
government’s interest in the finality and financial savings of an alien’s
voluntary departure. Id. at 390-91. Finally, the court found that the
Title’s statutorily fixed jurisdictional limits and 60-day maximum for
voluntary departures precluded judicial intervention. Id. at 390.

Removal – Definition of “Crime Involving Moral Turpitude”:
Hashish v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2006)
The 7th Circuit reviewed a request for cancellation of removal by
the petitioner alien, who stated that the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”) erred in finding that he had committed “crimes involving moral
turpitude” as contained within 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C). Id. at 575-75.
Reviewing its decision in Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2004),
the court noted that the circuits split over courts should defer to a BIA
decision to BIA to classify a crime as one “involving moral turpitude”.
Id. at 575 n.2. In Mei, the 7th Circuit stated that the Supreme Court in
Chevron extended deference to other BIA interpretations of immigration
statutes. Mei, 393 F.3d at 739. Currently, the 1st, 3rd, and 8th Circuits
extend such deference to BIA classifications of a crime as being one
“involving moral turpitude”, while the 5th and 9th Circuits do not. Id. As
in Mei, the 7th Circuit felt that the level of deference given the BIA’s
decisions to classify a crime as one “involving moral turpitude” is
unimportant, as the BIA’s determination had to be upheld. Id. at 575 n.2.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction – Exhaustion of Remedies: Geach v.
Chertoff, 444 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 2006)
The 8th Circuit recognized that it was “prohibited from exercising
subject-matter jurisdiction when an alien fails to exhaust administrative
remedies ‘unless the petition presents grounds which the court finds
could not have been presented in such prior proceeding[s].’” Id. at 945.
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The court joined other circuits that have considered this issue, such as the
1st, 7th, and 9th Circuits, and held that it had “subject-matter jurisdiction
over aliens’ unexhausted constitutional claims unless the claims concern
procedural errors correctable by the administrative tribunal.” Id.

Firm Resettlement – Burden of Proof: Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450
F.3d 961 (9th Cir. 2006)
The 9th Circuit noted that in an immigration suit where an alien
claiming asylum stayed for a time in a third country before coming to the
United States, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) must meet
a threshold requirement of showing that the alien had a right to stay in
the interim country. Id. at 964. The court noted that meeting that
requirement creates a rebuttable presumption of “firm resettlement” that
the alien must defeat in order to prevail. Id. The 9th circuit found that
proof of firm resettlement could be met if the DHS showed “direct
evidence of an offer issued by the third country’s government or, where
no direct evidence of a formal government offer is obtainable, by
circumstantial evidence of sufficient force to indicate that the third
country officially sanctions the alien’s indefinite presence.” Id. This
ruling agreed with decisions from the 1st, 7th, 8th and 10th circuits. Id.
The 2nd, 4th and D.C. Circuits disagree and favor a more comprehensive
“totality of the circumstances” approach. Id. at 986.

Jurisdictional Limitations – Immigration Continuances:
Bogdanov v. Gonzales, No. 04-4086, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 21858
(7th Cir. Aug. 24, 2006)
The 7th Circuit explained that the jurisdictional bar to judicial
review of immigration continuances found in 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) did not apply to extreme situations “where the
procedural ruling effectively disposes of the entire case.” Id. at *8. The
court noted that the 10th Circuit had previously declined to “review a
discretionary denial of a continuance for lack of jurisdiction” while the
11th Circuit had denied a “petition for review on the merits after finding
that jurisdiction exist[ed].” Id. at *7. The 7th Circuit stated that its
decision was taking the middle ground, recognizing that “the statute bars
review of most denials of continuances” and at the same time
acknowledging “that in some circumstances the denial of a continuance
may fall outside the statute.” Id.
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Jurisdictional Limitations – Alien Convictions: Alim v. Gonzales,
446 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2006)
The 11th Circuit determined the jurisdictional limitations of courts
to review the Board of Immigration Appeal’s (“BIA”) final orders of
removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). Id. at 1246. Jurisdiction is
barred if an alien “is convicted of two or more crimes involving moral
turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct.” Id.
In the instant case, the circuit court “vacated [appellant alien’s domestic
battery plea] because [he] was not advised—as required by Florida law—
of the immigration consequences when he pled no contest.” Id. at 1247.
Section 1101(a)(48)(A) defines “conviction” without directly addressing
convictions that are vacated to remedy a defect in the underlying
criminal proceeding. Id. at 1248. The 11th Circuit, joining the 3rd, 7th,
and 10th Circuits, deferred to the BIA’s interpretation that where
convictions are vacated “because there was a legal defect in the
underlying proceeding (i.e., a violation of a constitutional or statutory
right), then there is no longer a conviction for purposes of the
[Immigration and Nationality Act].” Id. at 1249-50. This ruling counters
the 5th Circuit. Id. at 1250.
Petition for Habeas Corpus – Alien’s Challenge of Removal:
Kholyavskiy v. Achim, 443 F.3d 946 (7th Cir. 2006)
The 7th Circuit explained that “[t]he circuits have divided on the
question of whether a detained alien challenging his impending removal
must name the warden of his detention facility in a petition for habeas
corpus, or whether the alien may name an immigration official instead.”
Id. at 950. Furthermore, “unlike the cases that have precipitated
disagreement among some of our sister circuits, Mr. Kholyavskiy’s
petition for habeas corpus does not challenge the validity of his removal
order, but instead attacks the constitutionality of his confinement while
he was awaiting removal.” Id. at 952. Therefore, the court did not
address the split and instead applied Padilla to the appellant’s “excessive
detention” complaint. Id. at 953.
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BANKRUPTCY
Bankruptcy Law – Interline Trust Doctrine: Norfolk S. Ry. v.
Consol. Freightways Corp. (In re Consol. Freightways Corp.), 443
F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2006)
Plaintiff, which provided freighting services for the now-bankrupt
defendant, urged the court to exclude certain funds from the defendant’s
bankruptcy estate under the interline trust doctrine. Id. at 1161-62. Under
this doctrine, when several companies collaborate to provide freight
services, but payment is only collected by one such company, the
company receiving payment is deemed to hold the funds in trust. Id. at
1161. Funds held in this manner would not become a part of the
bankruptcy estate if the holding company then filed for bankruptcy,
since, by holding the funds in trust, the holding company does not
become a creditor. Id. at 1161-62 The 3rd and 6th Circuits recognize the
interline trust doctrine, but the 7th Circuit has rejected it. Id. at 1165.
The court framed its analysis of whether to adopt the interline trust
doctrine as a matter of federal common law by recalling the Supreme
Court’s warning that “cases in which judicial creation of a special federal
rule would be justified . . . are . . . limited to situations where there is a
significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of
state law.” Id. at 1162. The court then reviewed the federal interests in
bankruptcy law and interstate transportation to determine if such a
conflict existed. Id. at 1163. The court declared that, although Congress
considered legislation concerning interline balances, “[n]othing in the
Bankruptcy Code creates a special status for interline balances . . . [and]
[t]hus, one cannot say that the underlying principles of federal
bankruptcy law auger for the recognition of a federal common law rule.”
Id. at 1162-63. Similarly, the court found that federal regulation of the
transportation industry was not of such a nature that it brought federal
policy into direct conflict with the use of state law, such that a federal
common law rule should be created. Id. at 1163-64. Moreover, the court
noted, there has been a trend towards federal deregulation of the
transportation industry. Id. at 1164. As such, the court joined the 7th
Circuit in rejecting the interline trust doctrine. Id. at 1165.
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CONSTITUTIONAL/FEDERAL LAW
Freedom of Speech – Requirements for the Enactment of
Initiatives: Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082
(10th Cir. 2006)
The 10th Circuit considered whether freedom of speech is
implicated when “a supermajority requirement for enactment of
initiatives on specific topics” is imposed. Id. at 1085. The court
determined that freedom of speech is not implicated as a result of the
requirement, disagreeing with the 1st Circuit which holds that “a state
constitutional provision prohibiting ballot initiatives on a particular
subject constitutes a restriction on speech subject to intermediate
scrutiny.” Id. The 10th Circuit explained that “the right to free speech . . .
[is] not implicated by the state’s creation of an initiative procedure, but
only by the state’s attempts to regulate speech associated with an
initiative procedure.” Id. at 1099. The court added that “[t]he distinction
is between laws that regulate or restrict the communicative conduct of
persons advocating a position in a referendum, which warrant strict
scrutiny, and laws that determine the process by which legislation is
enacted, which do not.” Id. at 1099-1100.

First Amendment – Article III Independent Standing
Requirement for Intervenor-Applicants: Prete v. Bradbury, 438
F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2006)
In an appeal affirming a ballot measure’s prohibition of payment to
petition signature gatherers as constitutional under the First Amendment,
the 9th Circuit noted that a circuit split exists as to whether intervenorapplicants must establish independent Article III standing in order to
intervene as of right. Id. at 956. The court cited cases from the 8th and
D.C. Circuits that require a party to show independent standing before
intervening as of right, in contrast to other cases from the 2nd and 6th
Circuits that allow intervention without such standing. Id. The 9th Circuit
did not have to reach the issue in this case, since the motion to intervene
being reviewed on appeal had been granted on other grounds. Id.
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Freedom of Association – Applying the Free Speech Test for
Public Employees to Freedom of Association: Shrum v. City of
Coweta, 449 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2006)
The 10th Circuit acknowledged that the circuit courts disagree over
whether the Supreme Court’s use of the Pickering test to determine a
public employee’s right to freedom of speech should be applied to a
public employee’s right to freedom of association. Id. at 1138. Instead of
making a statement on that broader question, the court ruled that the
Pickering test, and more precisely the issue of “public concern,” does not
apply when the public employee’s association is with a union. Id. The
court reasoned that by reaching an agreement with a union, an employer
contractually accepted the union, receives some benefit from the
agreement, and is therefore “estopped from claiming that its ‘interests as
an employer’ are inconsistent with the freedom of its employees to
associate with the union . . . .” Id. at 1139. The court noted that this is a
narrow holding on a broader question. Id. at 1138. The 5th and 11th
Circuits more broadly rejected the “public concern factor” in considering
a public employee’s freedom of association. Id. at 1139. The 2nd, 4th,
6th, 7th, and 9th Circuits disagree and generally apply the pubic concern
factor of the Pickering test regarding freedom of association. Id.
First Amendment – Workplace Speech: Weaver v. Chavez, 458
F.3d 1096 (10th Cir. 2006)
In reviewing the propriety of a State’s discharge, the court warned
that a State is prohibited from “discharg[ing] an employee on a basis that
infringes that employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom
of speech.” Id. at 1099. The court recognized, however, that a State,
acting in the dual role of government and employer, must be afforded
greater leeway when acting in its role as employer in order to effectively
carry out is duties. Id. Specifically, the court articulated that, where an
employee’s speech touches on matters of “public concern,” the court is
required to “balance the employee’s interest in commenting upon matters
of public concern against the interest of the State . . . in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Id.
The court noted, however, that “[a]lthough superficially simple, the
distinction between ‘finding facts’ and ‘applying law’ can be quite
elusive,” and hence it is unclear to what extent the jury should be
engaged in making this determination. Id. at 1101. Indeed, the court
recognized that there is a split between the Circuits concerning the role
of the jury vel non in aiding in this determination, with the 2nd and 8th
Circuits allowing the jury to play some role, while the 4th Circuit
rejected such a possibility. Id. The court joined the 2nd and 8th Circuits,
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holding that, because “[t]the district court . . . is generally in the best
position to assess whether the inquiry involves an underlying question of
historical fact . . . the decision to submit questions of fact to the jury is
within the sound discretion of the district court.” Id. at 1102. In
conclusion, the court reiterated that while the courts must be the final
arbiter of the constitutional claims, it is permissible to submit underlying
questions of historical fact to the jury. Id. Accordingly, the court upheld
the district’s court submittal of fact-sensitive issues to the jury pertaining
to the balancing determination. Id.

ERISA – “De Facto” Administrator and Denial of Benefits: Rud
v. Liberty Life Assurance Co., 438 F.3d 772 (7th Cir. 2006)
The 7th Circuit determined that a “de facto” plan administrator can
exist alongside an official plan administrator, where an insurance
company determines who can receive benefits under a plan administered
and explained by the employer company. Id. at 774. The court suggested
that equitable estoppel could prevent an employer from denying its status
as plan sponsor to avert any potential for confusion surrounding
decision-making power. Id. at 774-75. The court commented that the 8th
Circuit does not acknowledge “de facto” administrators. Id. at 774.
Further, the court rejected the 3rd, 8th, and 11th Circuits’ approach of
automatically assuming a conflict of interest to allow departure from the
“arbitrary and capricious” standard for denial of benefits, and the sliding
scale approach employed by the 5th, 7th and 10th Circuits in determining
whether a conflict of interests exists. Id. at 775-77. Instead, the court here
sought to preserve freedom of contract by following its precedent and the
9th Circuit’s method that permits a plaintiff to show that “the particular
circumstances of his case demonstrate the existence of a real and not
merely notional conflict of interest . . . the parties would not have
foreseen when they agreed that the plan administrator’s determinations
would be conclusive.” Id. at 777.

ERISA Recovery of Attorney’s Fees – Computer-Based
Research: Trs. of the Constr. Indus. & Laborers Health & Welfare
Trust v. Redland Ins. Co., 460 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 2006)
The 9th Circuit held that a prevailing plaintiff in an ERISA action
for delinquent contributions may recover as attorney’s fees, “reasonable
charges for computerized research . . . if separate billing for such
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expenses is ‘the prevailing practice in the local community.’” Id. at 1259.
The court noted a circuit split as to “whether expenses for computerbased legal research are compensable as ‘reasonable attorney’s fees.’” Id.
at 1258. The court recognized that the 1st, 2nd, 10th, and D.C. Circuits
agree with the 9th Circuit on this issue. Id. The court further noted that
only the 8th Circuit is in disagreement, requiring fees for computer-based
research to be included in the attorney’s hourly rate. Id. The court
emphasized that “‘reasonable attorney’s fees’ do not include costs that,
like expert fees, have by tradition and statute been treated as a category
of expenses distinct from attorney’s fees.” Id. The court also stated that
“‘reasonable attorney’s fees’ include litigation expenses only when it is
‘the prevailing practice in a given community’ for lawyers to bill those
costs separately from their hourly rates.” Id.

LABOR LAW
Arbitration – “Just Cause” Provisions in Collective Bargaining
Agreements: LB&B Assoc., Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
Local No. 113, 461 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2006)
The 10th Circuit adopted the approach used by the 3rd and 6th
Circuits to compel affirmation of an arbitrator’s interpretation of a “just
cause” termination provision in a collective bargaining agreement, where
the agreement did not explicitly provide that a listed offense was such a
cause. Id. at 1200. In adopting its view, the court acknowledged that the
parties had bargained for arbitration as a means of resolving disputes,
and indicated that an arbitrator’s interpretation of the circumstances
amounting to just cause for a termination warranted deference. Id.

Contracts – Evidence of Bargaining History: Paper, AlliedIndustrial, Chem. & Energy Workers Int’l Union Local No. 4-2001
v. ExxonMobil Ref. & Supply Co., 449 F.3d 616 (5th Cir. 2006)
The 5th Circuit explored the role that bargaining history plays in
the interpretation of contracts. Id. at 620. The court rejected the 9th
Circuit’s view that “evidence of bargaining history can be ‘most forceful
evidence’ that a particular dispute is not arbitrable.” Id. Instead, the court
annunciated its view that “evidence of bargaining experience can be
introduced only where the contract language is ambiguous as to
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arbitrability.” Id. The court defended its position saying that a court
“must construe the ‘language of the contract as finally agreed upon . . . in
accordance with ordinary rules of construction without reference to the
give and take of the bargaining sessions which produced the final
terminology.’” Id. The court explained that any other construction would
completely abandon the parol evidence rule. Id.

CRIMINAL MATTERS
SENTENCING
Sentencing Guidelines – General Intent Requirement: United
States v. Brown, 449 F.3d 154 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
The D.C. Circuit followed the 9th Circuit in determining that a
general intent requirement precludes imposition of the minimum ten-year
sentence for discharging a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Id. at
156. The court stated that requiring a finding of general intent comports
with the “presumption against strict liability in criminal statutes.” Id. at
157. In so holding, the court rejected the contrary view embraced by the
10th Circuit, which has found that no intent requirement should be
necessary for application of sentencing statutes that do not establish
independent offenses. Id. at 158.

Sentence Enhancements – Prior Criminal Convictions: United
States v. Torres-Duenas, 461 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2006)
The 10th Circuit held that no plain error occurred where a district
court enhanced a defendant’s sentence by 16 levels as a result of a prior
criminal conviction. Id. at 1182. The court analyzed the language in
comment 3(A) to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a) which states that “aggravated
felony . . . ‘has the meaning given that term in section 101(a)(43) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)), without
regard to the date of conviction for the aggravated felony.’” Id. at 1181.
The court reasoned that the phrase “without regard to the date of
conviction” means that a crime of violence is to be considered without
regard to the date of conviction. Id. at 1182. The court noted that the 11th
Circuit, the only other circuit to have addressed this issue, reached the
same conclusion, but on different grounds. Id. at 1181-82.
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Dangerous Weapons – Upward Departure from Sentencing
Guidelines: United States v. Chase, 451 F.3d 474 (8th Cir. 2006)
The 8th Circuit held that U.S.S.G. §§ 5K2.6 and 5K2.8 both permit
an upward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines for the use of a
dangerous weapon in a voluntary murder case. Id. at 483. The court, in
agreement with the 7th and 9th Circuits, found that the voluntary
manslaughter guidelines did not consider the use of a dangerous weapon
in sentencing. Id. The court noted that the Guidelines allow for departure
from the recommended sentence when certain circumstances are present
in a case, as long as the specific offense guideline has not already
considered that circumstance in the formulation of the recommended
sentence. Id. at 482. The 8th Circuit noted that “[c]ourts [are] to treat
each guideline as carving out a ‘heartland,’ a set of typical cases
embodying the conduct that each guideline describes.” Id. at 482.
The court further noted that the voluntary manslaughter section of
the Guidelines do not mention use of a weapon, and use of a weapon
could not be inferred from the underlying offense. Id. at 483. This
conflicts with holdings in the 4th and 10th Circuits, where the use of a
dangerous weapon is included in the sentencing recommendation for
voluntary murder. Id. at 482-83. The 4th Circuit held that although the
voluntary manslaughter guideline did not take the use of a dangerous
weapon into account, most murders are committed with a dangerous
weapon, therefore the dangerous weapon falls within the ‘heartland’ of
the guideline. Id. at 483. The 10th Circuit held that since the end result of
the conduct leading to the offense is murder, it implies that any
instrumentality used was done so in a dangerous manner. Id.

Armed Career Criminal Act – Letterlough Balancing Test:
United States v. Leeson, 453 F.3d 631 (4th Cir. 2006)
In analyzing whether a felon qualified for an increased sentence
under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e),
the 4th Circuit used a balancing test, including the five Letterlough
factors, to determine whether the defendant had committed two separate
and distinct criminal episodes as required by 924(e). Id. at 640. The 6th
Circuit had analyzed a similar issue but concluded differently, without
using the Letterlough factors. Id. The 4th Circuit stated that it “simply
disagree[d] with the 6th Circuit’s analysis.” Id. at 643.
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Liberty Interest – Specific Condition That Must be Supported
on the Record: United States v. Weber, 451 F.3d 552 (9th Cir.
2006)
The 9th Circuit followed circuit precedent by “generally not
requir[ing] a district court to articulate the reasons behind imposing a
certain condition.” Id. at 561. However, the court articulated that if “the
condition implicates a particularly significant liberty interest of the
defendant, then the district court must support its decision . . . with . . .
evidence that the condition of supervised release sought to be imposed is
‘necessary to accomplish one or more of the factors listed in §
3583(d)(1)’ and ‘involves [a reasonably necessary] deprivation of
liberty.’” Id. at 561. The court noted that this approach disagrees with the
3rd and 10th Circuits, which “require an explanation for each supervised
release condition.” Id. at 560 n.10.

Plain Statements – Threat of Death Sentencing Enhancement:
United States v. Jennings, 439 F.3d 604 (9th Cir. 2006)
The 9th Circuit followed circuit precedent by employing an
“objective, reasonable teller” test to determine whether a bank robber’s
plain statement that he has a gun is “sufficient to instill a fear of death in
a victim” and warrant a two-level “threat of death” sentencing
enhancement under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 605. The court
noted that prior to the 1997 amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines,
the 11th Circuit had employed a “cramped” requirement of “direct”
threats, but has since recognized that view as no longer correct. Id. at
610.

Judicially Found Facts – Increasing a Mandatory Minimum
Sentence: United States v. Lizardo, 445 F.3d 73 (1st Cir. 2006)
The 1st Circuit rejected defendant’s argument that the district court
“committed plain error in determining the statutory mandatory minimum
sentence on the basis of a drug quantity found by the judge rather than by
the jury.” Id. at 89. The court cited one of its recent opinions that
“addressed precisely this issue” and “upheld the district court’s
application of a mandatory minimum sentence under [21 U.S.C.] §
841(b)(1) based on judicially found facts.” Id. The 1st Circuit followed
circuit precedent, restating that “judicially found facts can be used to
increase the statutory mandatory minimum sentence under § 841(b)(1).”
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Id. at 90. The court noted that “Booker left intact the Supreme Court’s
precedent in Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 568 (2002), which
allowed the use of judicially found facts to increase a mandatory
minimum sentence.” Id. This ruling conflicts with the determination of
the 4th, 9th, and D.C. Circuits, as well as a concurrence in the 3rd
Circuit. Id. at n.11.
Post-Booker – Harmless Error: United States v. Woods, 440 F.3d
255 (5th Cir. 2006)
The 5th Circuit found that “a sentence imposed at the top of the
Guidelines-determined range might be sufficient to prevent a defendant
from prevailing under plain-error review, but not sufficient to
demonstrate that a Booker error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
. . . .” Id. at 259. The court recognized that the 2nd Circuit agrees on this
issue. Id. at 259. However, the 10th Circuit has disagreed. Id. at 259 n.3.
The court noted that the 10th Circuit based its disagreement on the 6th
Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Bruce, 396 F.3d 697 (6th Cir. 2005),
which held that the “opinion . . . concludes only that a sentence at the top
end of the Guidelines-determined range was probative under the plainerror standard, not the harmless error standard. Moreover, the Sixth
Circuit’s opinion on these grounds in Bruce was later vacated, and the
defendant’s sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing.” Id. The
5th Circuit further noted, “whether imposition of consecutive sentences
is sufficient to demonstrate that a Booker error is harmless is a factsensitive inquiry that must examine the relationship between the two
sentences imposed.” Id. at 260. The court “conclude[ed] that the
government ha[d] failed to meet its burden of showing beyond a
reasonable doubt that the district court would have imposed the same
sentence under the post-Booker advisory sentencing regime.” Id. at 26162.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
“Physical Force” under the ACCA: United States v. Griffith, 455
F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2006)
The 11th Circuit held that a prior conviction for violating Georgia’s
battery statute qualified as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence”
that could satisfy the elements for conviction for carrying a firearm under
the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C.S. § 922(g)(9). Id.
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at 1340. The ACCA defines the term “misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence” to include an offense that “(i) is a misdemeanor under . . . State
. . . law; and (ii) has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical
force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current
or former spouse . . . .” Id. at 1341. In this case, the 11th Circuit held that
Georgia’s battery statute, which included as an element “[i]ntentionally
makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with the
person of another[,]” qualified as a “use of physical force” and thus
convicted defendant for possession of a firearm. Id. In doing so, the 11th
Circuit followed the 1st and 8th Circuits which also reasoned that
“physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature” was necessarily
“physical force” as used in § 922(g)(9). Id. The court reasoned that “[a]
person cannot make physical contact—particularly of an insulting or
provoking nature—with another without exerting some level of physical
force.” Id. at 1342. The court departed from the 9th Circuit, which had
read the word “violent” before the element of “physical force” in the
ACCA, in order to differentiate physical “force” from “contact.” Id. at
1345. The court criticized the 9th Circuit for neglecting to “carry[] out
the assignment of responsibility that Congress ha[d] decided upon, courts
should be faithful to the language that [Congress] has chosen to express
its will.” Id. at 1344.

Bank Fraud - Mens Rea of Fraud: United States v. Leahy, 445
F.3d 634 (3d Cir. 2005)
In this criminal case, the 3rd Circuit examined the reading of 18
U.S.C. § 1344 regarding what constitutes bank fraud. Id. at 642. The
court ruled that the two provisions of § 1344 could not be read in a
disjunctive manner, and that an intent to defraud a bank is an element of
both sections. Id. at 642-43. The court also noted the circuits currently
disagree as to the exact reading of § 1344, stating that the 2nd Circuit
does read it in the disjunctive. Id. at 643 n.6. Despite the difference in
reading however, the interpretation of the statute with regard to the intent
element is the same in the two circuits, and the 5th and 7th Circuits have
similarly held that the intent to defraud a bank is required for both
sections of the statute. Id. The 6th Circuit, however, has taken an
opposite view, stating that § 1344(2) does not require any intent by the
defendant to defraud a bank. Id.
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Statute of Limitations – Post-Conviction Motions: Jones v.
Hulick, 449 F.3d 784 (7th Cir. 2006)
The 7th Circuit upheld the lower court’s determination that
defendant’s post-conviction application for a habeas petition was
untimely. Id. at 789. The court followed 7th Circuit precedent in
denying defendant’s request to toll the 90-day period during which
defendant could, but did not, file a petition for a writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court for purposes of extending the statute of limitations. Id. at
788. In so holding, the 7th Circuit reinforced the split with the 5th, 10th
and 11th Circuits, which have allowed the tolling of the statute of
limitations for pending post-conviction motions. Id. at 789.

Retroactive Application – Crawford Interpretation: Fulcher v.
Motley, 444 F.3d 791 (6th Cir. 2006)
The 6th Circuit rejected appellant’s argument that the Supreme
Court, in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), announced a
“watershed rule” of criminal procedure (regarding the admissibility of
testimonial hearsay evidence under the Sixth Amendment) that “warrants
retroactive application” to cases undergoing collateral review. Id. at 811.
The court observed that “[a] panel of the Sixth Circuit rejected this
conclusion in Dorchy v. Jones, 398 F.3d 783, 788 (6th Cir. 2005).” Id. In
a concurring opinion, Judge Clay agreed with appellant’s argument,
contending that “[t]he Dorchy v. Jones case . . . does not actually treat
Crawford’s retroactivity sufficiently to bind subsequent panels of this
Court.” Id. at 813. Judge Clay noted an existing circuit split on the
Crawford retroactivity issue in which the 9th Circuit held that Crawford
applies retroactively, and the 2nd, 7th, and 10th Circuits have held that it
does not. Id. at 818-19. The court here followed circuit precedent and
stated “we find it unnecessary to address . . . Judge Clay’s concern that
the analysis in Dorchy was insufficiently thorough to bind later panels of
this court.” Id. at 811. The court thus reaffirmed its alignment with the
2nd, 7th, and 10th Circuits and noted that “a petition for a writ of
certiorari was filed on November 7, 2005 and currently pends” regarding
the 9th Circuit’s Crawford retroactivity determination. Id.
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Plain Language Review – The Meaning of “Hearing” in the
Context of a State Domestic Violence Order: United States v.
Young, 458 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2006)
The 9th Circuit joined the 6th and 8th Circuits by following the
plain language of a statutory definition of “hearing” to deny the necessity
for validation of an underlying state proceeding that granted a domestic
violence order. Id. at 1006. Rejecting constitutional concerns that
prompted the 7th Circuit to insist upon due process inquiries into
domestic violence orders, the court construed the explicit language of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) to require that the state proceeding only afford the
defendant “actual notice and an opportunity to participate.” Id. The 9th
Circuit reasoned that such inquiries did not follow the “statutory scheme
as whole” as guided by the Supreme Court’s decision in Lewis v. United
States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980). Id. at 1005.

Definition of “Use” of Firearms – Bartering of Drugs: United
States v. Cotto, 456 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006)
The 1st Circuit held that a person who “barters drugs for firearms
has ‘used’ the firearms within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A),”
which imposes a “mandatory five-year sentence for using a firearm
‘during and in relation to any . . . drug trafficking crime.’” Id. at 26. The
court explained that the 3rd, 5th, 8th, and 9th Circuits have treated
bartering drugs for firearms as “use” under § 924(c)(1)(A), while the
D.C., 6th, 7th, and 11th Circuits held the opposite. Id. at 28. The 1st
Circuit noted that it was following the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
“use” of a firearm as an item for barter in Smith v. United States, 508
U.S. 223 (1993). Id. at 27-28. The court concluded that “use” under §
924(c) did apply to instances of bartering with or for firearms. Id. at 2829.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Admissibility of Evidence – Denial of Motion for Court’s
Recusal: United States v. Giordano, 442 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 2006)
The 2nd Circuit rejected the argument that the trial court should
have recused itself from hearing and ruling on the admissibility of
wiretap evidence “because it had earlier authorized the Title III
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applications and supervised the wiretap.” Id. at 48. The court recognized
that the “authorization of a wiretap under Title III does not ‘evidence the
degree of favoritism or antagonism required’ to necessitate recusal under
§ 455(a) from ruling on the admissibility of the resulting evidence.” Id.
The court noted that it joined the 1st and 5th Circuits in considering and
rejecting this argument. Id.

Fourth Amendment – Requirements for Search Warrant
Affidavits: Baranski v. Fifteen Unknown Agents, 452 F.3d 433 (6th
Cir. 2006)
The 6th Circuit held that the failure to attach an affidavit to a search
warrant does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 436. The court
looked at the “totality of the circumstances” in holding that it would have
been a better practice to attach the affidavit to the search warrant, but that
the failure to do so did not make the search unconstitutional. Id. at 44445. This contradicts the holding of the 9th Circuit. Id. at 449. The 9th
circuit has held that to meet the particularity requirement of the Fourth
Amendment, the search warrant must incorporate the affidavit and that
the affidavit must also accompany the search warrant at the time of its
execution. Id.

CONSTITUTIONAL/FEDERAL ISSUES
Extended Traffic Stop – Consent: United States v. Rodriguez,
No. 05-7082, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13060 (10th Cir. May 23,
2006)
The 10th Circuit addressed whether law enforcement must advise
an individual that he or she is free to terminate an encounter in order for
the extended encounter to be deemed consensual. Id. at *10. The court
declined to adopt the position of the 9th Circuit, which stated that “unless
a person is explicitly told that she is free to leave then a reasonable
person would not have concluded that she is.” Id. at *9. Instead, the 10th
Circuit declared that it would use a “totality of the circumstances” test in
order to determine whether an extended encounter was voluntary and
consensual. Id. at *10. The court held that a law enforcement officer is
not required to advise an individual that he or she may decline
questioning or otherwise terminate the encounter. Id.
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Voir Dire – Juror Impartiality: United States v. Guzman, 450
F.3d 627 (6th Cir. 2006)
The 6th Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument that the jury pool
was biased by follow-up questioning during voir dire, rendering the pool
partial. Id. at 633. The court stated that the Supreme Court has not
established any per se rule that it requires trial judges to follow regarding
voir dire of the jury pool. Id. at 629. Trial judges are therefore given
great deference in their voir dire procedure. Id. at 630. Applying this
deferential standard, the court found that defendant relied entirely on
speculation and failed to provide any sufficient evidence to overcome the
presumption of juror impartiality. Id. at 629. In so holding, the 6th
Circuit aligned itself with the majority of the circuit courts. Id. at 630.
Only the 9th Circuit has found that additional voir dire may be necessary
where a potential juror offers “expert-like statements” that could have
tainted the jury pool. Id. at 631. The 6th Circuit distinguished the 9th
Circuit rule, finding that there was no offering of “expert-like
statements” to the jury pool in this case. Id. at 631-32.

Double Jeopardy – Blockburger Test: United States v. Agofsky,
458 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. 2006)
The 5th Circuit re-considered whether a defendant can be convicted
of two separate crimes for one single act without violating his double
jeopardy rights, when those crimes contain different jurisdictional
elements, but are in all other aspects, the same offense. Id. 371-72.
Previously, in United States v. Gibson, 820 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1987), the
court had held that because the purpose of the Blockburger test is to
adhere to Congress’s desire to combat certain evil conduct, jurisdictional
elements are irrelevant in double jeopardy analysis. Id. at 372. The 9th
Circuit rejected Gibson because it “ignores the fact that Congress may
have strong interests in treating crimes occurring within the jurisdiction
of the United States differently from those occurring elsewhere.” Id..
Here, the 5th Circuit questioned its ruling in Gibson, citing the 9th
Circuit’s reasoning in United States v. Hairston, 64 F.3d 491 (9th Cir.
1995). Id. However, this court ultimately upheld Gibson, leaving further
analysis to either its en banc panel or the Supreme Court. Id.
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Sixth Amendment – Dual Sovereignty Doctrine: United States v.
Constanza, 440 F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 2006)
The 4th Circuit applied the dual sovereignty doctrine in the Sixth
Amendment context. The court held that federal and state crimes are
separate crimes for the purpose of the constitutional right to counsel, a
right which arises merely for the specific offense for which a defendant
is charged. Id. at 196-97. The court noted its agreement with other
circuits, including the 1st and 5th, while noting that the 2nd Circuit
continues to hold to the contrary. Id. at 198.

False Arrest Claims: Wallace v. City of Chicago, 440 F.3d 421
(7th Cir. 2006)
The 7th Circuit clarified the law governing when a false arrest
claim accrues, by reaffirming its holding in Booker v. Ward, 94 F.3d
1052 (7th Cir. 1996), and explaining that an “unlawful arrest claim . . .
accrues on the day of [ ] arrest.” Id. at 427. The court also overruled
Gauger v. Hendle, 349 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 2003), as it contradicts Booker
and the instant case. Id. at 423. The court noted that “the [2nd, 4th, 5th,
6th, and 9th Circuits] have held that false arrest claims that would
undermine the defendant’s conviction cannot be brought until the
conviction is nullified.” Id. at 428. The court also recognized that the 1st,
3rd, 8th, 10th, and 11th Circuits, like the 7th Circuit, “have held that
false arrest claims accrue at the time of arrest.” Id. The court recognized
that, by aligning itself with one side of the split, it did not “break any
new ground.” Id.

Strickland Test – Scope of the Sullivan Rule: Schwab v. Crosby,
451 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2006)
The 11th Circuit disagreed “with the Second Circuit’s statements in
Tueros about the Supreme Court’s analysis and statements in Mickens[,]”
that the Supreme Court’s discussion about the scope of the Sullivan rule
is dicta and should not be considered binding. Id. at 1237. The court also
disagreed with the 4th Circuit to the extent, if any, that the “Fourth
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Stitt, 441 F.3d 297, 303-305 (4th
Cir. 2006) . . . treats the Supreme Court’s statements in Mickens in the
way the Second Circuit did in Tueros.” Id. at 1327. The court agreed
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with the reasoning of the 6th and 9th Circuits that the Mickens Court
“specifically and explicitly concluded that Sullivan was limited to joint
representation, and that any extension of Sullivan outside of the joint
representation context remained, as far as the jurisprudence of [the
Supreme Court was] concerned, an open question.” Id.

Due Process – Administrative Detention: Hill v. Fleming, 173 F.
App’x 664 (10th Cir. 2006)
The 10th Circuit looked at whether the prison condition at issue
presented the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state
might conceivably create a liberty interest requiring the provision of due
process to the defendant. Id. at 670. The court found that in determining
whether circumstances arise to an ‘atypical situation,’ the circuits have
differed on the baseline for comparison – “either relying squarely on
comparisons with other inmates in the same administrative segregation
or those in the general population.” Id. at 670-71. The court identified the
distinct approach and yet rejected them both, holding that “despite the
parties’ opposing contentions on which baseline applies, the result is the
same, no matter which baseline is used.” Id. at 670. The court made its
decision that way because it “has never held the conditions, duration or
restrictions of the detentions presented on appeal created a liberty
interest, even in circumstances where the detention exceeded the 399-day
duration of Mr. Hill’s detention or restricted some of the same
privileges.” Id. Ultimately, the court recognized that incarcerated
individuals retain only a narrow range of liberty interests and rejected
Hill’s claim as most circuits generally reject inmate contention of liberty
interest violations while in administrative detention. Id. at 671.

Miranda Rights – Interrogation: United States v. Courtney, 463
F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 2006)
The court ruled on statements allegedly made without prior
Miranda warnings. Id. at 335. On three separate occasions, government
agents had interviewed the defendant, but the defendant had only
received Miranda warnings before the third interview. Id. Applying
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), the district court suppressed the
evidence from all three interviews. Id. at 336. In Seibert, the Supreme
Court had proscribed the procedure of agents (1) questioning a defendant
without providing the proper Miranda warnings, (2) gaining a
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confession, and (3) following this with a warning and “cover the same
ground a second time” to obtain an admissible confession. Id. at 337.
However, “Siebert only addressed admissibility of the second, warned
statement; the first statement was inadmissible.” Id. The 5th Circuit
agreed with the 3rd Circuit in that a Siebert analysis does not apply
“when the first interrogation did not violate Miranda.” Id. The 5th
Circuit concluded that because the defendant was not subject to custodial
interrogation during the first two interviews, Miranda warnings were not
required. Id. at 337-38. Therefore, a Siebert analysis was erroneously
applied by the district court. Id. at 338.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

DNA Indexing Statutes – DNA Collection: United States v.
Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922 (11th Cir. 2006)
The 11th Circuit recognized that “every federal circuit considering
DNA indexing statutes has upheld the statutes as constitutional under the
Fourth Amendment,” and followed circuit precedent and the majority of
circuits in applying the “Knights reasonable” test. Id. at 924. The court
noted that under this test, the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 9th Circuits look to
“whether the search and seizure is reasonable based on the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the search and seizure and the nature of the
search and seizure itself.” Id. The court observed that the 2nd, 7th, and
10th Circuits employ the “special needs” inquiry. Id. The 11th Circuit
adopted the reasoning in United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 184
(3d Cir. 2005), and held that “the collection of DNA under the DNA Act
for inclusion in the CODIS database does not constitute an
unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”
Id. at 925.

Arrest Warrants – Reasonable Belief vs. Probable Cause:
United States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477 (6th Cir. 2006)
The 6th Circuit joined the majority of circuit courts in deciding that
“the standard required for establishing a ‘reasonable belief’ upon which
officers may rely in order to enter a third-party’s dwelling with only an
arrest warrant” for a suspect as opposed to a valid search warrant for the
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dwelling is a lesser standard than probable cause. Id. at 482. The
Supreme Court held in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), that
“an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it
the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when
there is reason to believe the suspect is within.” Id. at 482. The 9th
Circuit interpreted that holding to mean that probable cause is the
standard. Id. The court noted that “‘the reason to believe,’ or reasonable
belief, standard of Payton . . . embodies the same standard of
reasonableness inherent in probable cause.” Id. at 483. The 6th Circuit
disagreed with that analysis, finding that the Supreme Court’s “use of
‘probable cause’ in describing the foundation for an arrest warrant and its
use of ‘reason to believe’ in describing the basis for the authority to enter
a dwelling . . . shows that the Court intended different standards for the
two.” Id. at 484. The circuit felt that had the Supreme Court meant
otherwise, it would have expressly ruled, or used the same phrase for
each. Id. Furthermore, the 6th Circuit found that when enforcing an arrest
warrant, a reasonable belief that a suspect is within a residence is to be
based on common sense factors and the totality of the circumstances. Id.
at 485.

